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Introduction
WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY to terminate1a treaty? The Constitu-
tion’s text is silent on the matter, and historical precedent has been
anything but consistent.2 Recently, this debate has focused on the
President’s authority to unilaterally terminate a treaty,3 sparked by
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1. Some scholars differentiate between a treaty’s “termination,” which is done in ac-
cordance with international law, and a treaty’s “abrogation,” which is undertaken in viola-
tion of international law. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 156 (2007). However, this Article uses the terms interchangeably because
it focuses on the constitutional power of the legislature to end a treaty and not on whether
those actions would be taken in compliance with international law. It would initially ap-
pear, however, that most of these legislative actions would qualify as terminations as the
legislature has typically complied with an individual treaty’s termination provisions, explic-
itly legalized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) Articles 54–64.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 54–64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
Randall H. Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States:
Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REV. 879, 880 (1958). At the time of the 1979 treaty termi-
nation hearings, one noted scholar argued that the United States had only ever “abro-
gated” one treaty: the United States, “by an Act of Congress, signed by President Adams,”
unilaterally abrogated a treaty with France in 1798. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 310 (1979) [hereinafter Treaty Termination Hearings]
(statement of Professor Abram Chayes, Harvard University School of Law).
2. See, e.g., DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES
149–90 (1986) (analyzing the historical practice and concluding that there has been no
consistent means by which treaties were terminated). This varied precedent will be dis-
cussed throughout the Article as it relates to each section.
3. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 205–07 (2003); Joshua P. O’Donnell, Note, The
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Debate: Time for Some Clarification of the President’s Authority To Ter-
minate a Treaty, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1601 (2002); Christopher C. Sabis, Congress and
the Treaty Power: An Originalist Argument Against Unilateral Presidential Termination of the ABM
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two Presidents acting upon an asserted unilateral termination
authority.4
There has been comparatively little analysis of the converse ques-
tion: does Congress have the unilateral power to terminate a treaty in
the face of presidential opposition? While the question is in many
ways academic, as historically the majority of treaty terminations have
been undertaken by the legislature and executive acting coopera-
tively, it invokes strong separation of powers considerations. Is the
President constitutionally required to consider legislative opposition
to a treaty, or can he ignore it, continuing to bind the United States to
its international obligations? Similarly, does the President have to con-
sider congressional opposition to the United States signing, or leaving
its signature on a treaty, binding the United States to abide by the
treaty’s “object and purpose”?5 This Article will argue (1) that the
President must consider congressional opposition, (2) that Congress
does have the constitutional authority to terminate a treaty, and (3)
that the President is thereby constitutionally bound to consider con-
gressional objections.
As a background matter, it is necessary to distinguish between a
treaty’s domestic and international obligations. Domestically, there is
no question that Congress “may abrogate or amend [a treaty] as a
matter of internal law by simply enacting inconsistent legislation.”6
Under the last in time rule, if a treaty and a statute are in conflict, “the
one last in date will control the other: provided, always, the stipulation
of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.”7 However, inconsistent
domestic legislation does not “relieve the United States of its interna-
Treaty, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 223 (2002); David C. Scott, Comment, Presidential Power
to “Un-Sign” Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447 (2002).
4. In 1979, President Carter unilaterally terminated U.S. involvement in a 1954 Mu-
tual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, and in 2001, President Bush terminated U.S. involvement
in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter (Goldwater I),
481 F. Supp. 949, 951 (D.D.C.) (describing President Carter’s action and assessing its con-
stitutional validity), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); U.S. Quits
ABM Treaty, CNN, (Dec. 13, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-12-13/politics/rec.bush.
abm_1_abm-treaty-rogue-state-missile-attacks-anti-ballistic-missile - treaty?_s=PM:ALLPOLI
TICS (discussing President Bush’s termination of the ABM Treaty).
5. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 18., at 336 (dis-
cussing the circumstances under which “[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”).
6. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 375 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“In either case the last expression of the sovereign will
must control.”); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) (“A treaty may
supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”).
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tional obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that obliga-
tion.”8 If Congress were to pass inconsistent domestic legislation, it
would override domestic law, but leave international obligations unaf-
fected. As a result, when this Article discusses Congress’ ability to ter-
minate a treaty it is referring solely to termination of the United
States’ international obligations, the forum in which congressional
power is not as straightforward.
This Article argues that Congress’ independent constitutional
role in the termination of treaties must be recognized. In contrast to
other articles that have argued for a joint congressional-executive role
in treaty termination, this Article argues that there are constitutional
mechanisms by which Congress can terminate U.S. involvement in
treaties despite presidential opposition. Part I of this Article will
demonstrate that neither the Constitution’s text nor the Framers’ in-
tent identifies, let alone clarifies, which branch has the authority to
terminate treaties. Part II will analyze the ongoing debate regarding
the President’s unilateral authority to terminate treaties. Building on
this background, Part III will present the core of the argument, analyz-
ing each of the possible means by which either house of Congress
could influence the termination of a treaty. This Part will argue that
Congress’ primary means of terminating a treaty is to enact legisla-
tion, over a presidential veto if necessary, directing the President to
deliver to the foreign state or international depository the notice nec-
essary to terminate the treaty. Nevertheless, as Part IV will show, Con-
gress has limited means by which it can enforce this power, as it has
few tools available to compel a recalcitrant President to comply with
its directives. As a result, this Article will conclude by arguing that the
House and Senate should take a number of ex ante steps in the treaty
approval process to ensure they retain power in its possible
termination.
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(1)(b) (1987) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT]; see also Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd.,
291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (“[An act of Congress] would control in our courts as the later
expression of our municipal law . . . [and] the international obligation [would] remain[ ]
unaffected.”); RESTATEMENT, supra, § 115 cmt. b (1987) (“[A]lthough a subsequent act of
Congress may supersede a rule of international law or an international agreement as do-
mestic law, the United States remains bound by the rule or agreement internationally
under the principle stated in §321 [pacta sunt servanda].”); 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WIL-
LOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 324, at 585 (2d ed. 1929)
[hereinafter WILLOUGHBY, 2d ed.] (“The termination of a treaty as an international com-
pact carries with it the annulment of the agreement as a law of the land; but its annulment
as a law by Congress does not carry with it its annulment as an international compact.”).
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I. Textualism and the Framer’s’ Intent
Any constitutional interpretation must begin with an analysis of
the Constitution’s text. Given the Constitution’s limited coverage of
treaties however, this section will also analyze the Framer’s interpreta-
tion of the treaty power as well as the potentially analogous appoint-
ment power to better understand how the treaty termination power
was originally understood.
A. Direct Textualism
The Constitution’s only language relating to treaties indicates
that both the President and the Senate are required to create trea-
ties,9 but “it does not say who can unmake them.”10 The U.S. govern-
ment’s power to terminate its involvement in treaties is generally
recognized under international law11 and not expressly denied to the
government by the Constitution;12 however, the Constitution’s text
does not expressly indicate where that power resides. This oversight is
unsurprising given the Constitution’s consistent failure to indicate
which branch of government has the power to reverse many of its af-
firmatively granted powers.13
B. Framers’ Intent
While an analysis of the Framers’ intent can sometimes help clar-
ify ambiguous constitutional provisions, “the Framers never directly
discussed the power to terminate treaties in the Federalist or in the
Convention,”14 or even “in the state ratifying conventions that fol-
lowed.”15 Examining the Framers’ views of the treaty power more gen-
9. “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2.
10. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 211 (2d
ed. 1996).
11. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, arts. 54–64, at
344–47 (discussing the conditions under which a treaty can be terminated in compliance
with international law with the presumption that states have the ability to terminate their
treaty commitments). The United States is not a signatory to the VCLT but has accepted
many of its provisions as reflective of customary international law.
12. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 211.
13. Most obviously, the Constitution does not discuss who can exercise the necessary
ability to overturn or repeal any constitutionally enacted laws.
14. Sabis, supra note 3, at 248.
15. James J. Moriarty, Congressional Claims for Treaty Termination Powers in the Age of the
Diminished Presidency, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 123, 132 (1999); see also ADLER, supra note 2, at
89–111.
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erally only further confuses the analysis. The initial draft of the treaty
provision at the Constitutional Convention gave the Senate exclusive
control over treaties: “The Senate of the United States shall have the
power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of
the supreme Court.”16 However, within two weeks, a provision was
amended to divide the power between the President and the Senate:
“The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
have the power to make treaties . . . . But no Treaty (except Treaties of
Peace) shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the Mem-
bers present.”17 While some scholars argue that the Framers’ decision
to move the treaty power from Article I to Article II indicates an intent
to grant the power to the Executive, “there is no direct evidence of
why the Framers put the treaty power in Article II.”18 In fact, one of
the preeminent historians on the Convention argues that the place-
ment was due as much to fatigue as to anything else:
It was evident that the convention was growing tired. The commit-
tee had recommended that the power of appointment and the
making of treaties be taken from the senate and vested in the presi-
dent “by and with the advice and consent of the senate.” With sur-
prising unanimity and surprisingly little debate, these important
changes were agreed to.19
Looking outside of the Convention, individual Founders viewed trea-
ties as either a senatorial20 or presidential21 power, but no consensus
view ever emerged.22 Although authors from both ideological camps
16. Draft of Constitution Reported by Committee of Detail (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
17. Id. at 495 (citations omitted). The language was introduced by the Committee of
Eleven on September 7, 1787.
18. Sabis, supra note 3, at 251.
19. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 171
(1913); see also Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abroga-
tion of Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55
WASH. L. REV. 1, 91–114 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 2, 1791), in 1
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 523, 524 (1867) (“That the contracting
powers can annul the Treaty can not, I presume, be questioned, the same authority, pre-
cisely, being exercised in annulling as in making a Treaty.”).
21. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 42 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969) (“[T]hough treaties can
only be made by the President and Senate, their activity may be continued or suspended by
the President alone.”).
22. In fact, several Founders appeared to have changed their views over time. When
Jefferson had served as Secretary of State in 1793, he had viewed the President as having
final authority over treaty termination. Sabis, supra note 3, at 244 (“[T]he Constitution,
‘had made the President the last appeal’ concerning the termination of treaties, since the
legislature was supreme ‘in making the laws only.’”). However, later, when Jefferson was
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attempt to utilize this uncertainty as support for their own positions,23
the only unambiguously clear conclusion resulting from analyzing the
Founders’ views of the treaty process is that “[t]he intent of the Fram-
ers is thoroughly ambiguous.”24
C. Indirect Textualism
Given the Constitution’s silence and the Framers’ ambiguity,
many scholars have tried to analogize the treaty power with the ap-
pointment power, relying upon a form of indirect textualism to deter-
mine which branch of government has the power to terminate a
treaty. The treaty and appointment power are contained in the same
constitutional sentence and textually are almost identical:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pre-
sent concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other pub-
lic Ministers and Consuls . . . .25
Neither clause contains instructions on how to reverse the actions it
directs; the appointment clause contains no instructions for the re-
moval of officials, while the treaty clause is silent on how treaties can
be terminated.26 However, unlike the question of treaty termination,27
the Supreme Court has established substantial jurisprudence clarify-
ing who has the power to remove presidential appointees, providing
potentially useful indirect precedent.
President of the Senate in 1801, he viewed the legislature as having the sole authority to
terminate treaties. See id. (“Treaties being declared . . . to be the supreme law of the land, it
is understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them to be infringed and
rescinded.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON,
A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
(1801)).
23. Compare J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEGIS. 46, 49
(1978) (“[A]bsent any specific evidence that the Framers meant to confer an untrammeled
power upon the President in repealing treaties, it must be concluded the legislative body
continues to have a role in the abandonment of a treaty as it does in making the treaty.”),
with Nelson, supra note 1, at 887 (“In the absence of express limitations upon the power to
remove and the power to terminate, there is a strong presumption that no such limitation
was intended.”).
24. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 151 (1990); accord Goldwater I,
481 F. Supp. 949, 958 (D.D.C. 1979) (describing President Carter’s actions, assessing its
constitutional validity, and finding no “definitive evidence of the intentions of the Fram-
ers”), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
26. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 883 (citations omitted).
27. In its one opportunity to grapple with the question of who can terminate a treaty,
eight members of a fractured Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question by ruling
that the case was non-justiciable for a variety of reasons. See Goldwater I, 444 U.S. 996.
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In Myers v. United States,28 the Court was confronted for the first
time with the question of whether the President has the “exclusive
power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he
has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”29
The case arose out of President Wilson’s firing of a postmaster who
had been appointed under a law that explicitly conditioned the Presi-
dent’s ability to remove an appointee on the “advice and consent of
the Senate.”30 After reviewing the history of the Constitutional Con-
vention and the early Congresses, Chief Justice William Taft con-
cluded that the power of removal lay with the President alone,
arguing that “the fact that no express limit was placed on the power of
removal by the Executive was convincing indication that none was in-
tended.”31 Chief Justice Taft argued that the Senate’s involvement in
the appointment process should be “strictly construed”; the Execu-
tive’s power is “given in general terms” and is only “limited by direct
expressions where limitation was needed.”32 In other words, the ap-
pointment and removal of officers is an executive function permitting
Senate involvement only where explicitly provided for by the Constitu-
tion. While Myers was subsequently limited by a number of cases,33 it
still stands for the proposition that “unless a power granted to the
executive by the Constitution is specifically circumscribed, it belongs
to that branch alone.”34 Some have argued that the same analysis can
be applied to the treaty clause, “since the wording of the two powers is
nearly identical.”35
Nevertheless, despite the textual similarities between the provi-
sions, there are a number of reasons why the treaty termination ques-
28. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
29. Id. at 106.
30. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80.
31. Myers, 272 U.S. at 118.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (limiting the sole
Executive power of removal to those appointees who were engaged in executive and not
“quasi judicial or quasi legislative” functions); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988)
(seemingly relaxing the conditions from Humphrey’s Executor, stating that “the real question
is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s
ability to perform his constitutional duty”).
34. Sabis, supra note 3, at 239; see also Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, Litigating the
President’s Power to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT’L L. 647, 652–53 (1979) (arguing that the
Senate should not be given an implied termination right because it has never been granted
an implied removal right); Nelson, supra note 1, at 887 (“In the absence of express limita-
tions upon the power to remove and the power to terminate, there is a strong presumption
that no such limitation was intended.”).
35. Sabis, supra note 3, at 239.
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tion cannot be answered by reference to the Executive’s removal
power. First, the provisions are not identical. The Senate is granted
more involvement in the treaty process than in the appointment pro-
cess; the Constitution requires that treaties garner two-thirds accept-
ance of the Senators present while appointments require only a
simple majority.36 Furthermore, the President is given the “exclusive
power to make nominations to office, whereas in treaty-making the
Constitution does not set him apart in this special way from those who
advise and share responsibility with him.”37 Textually, both provisions
afford the Senate a greater role in the treaty process than it has in
appointments.
Second, it is more appropriate to compare a ratified treaty to
other duly enacted domestic legislation than it is to compare it to Ex-
ecutive appointments. Appointees help the President execute the law,
but a ratified treaty becomes part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”38
As such, it has the same domestic importance (and typically greater
international importance) as bills passed via the standard bicamera-
lism and presentment legislative process. Terminating a treaty is
therefore in many ways analogous to repealing a statute, a power that
requires the involvement of both Congress and the President. While
there are a number of important differences that caution against
treating the repeal of statutes and the termination of treaties identi-
cally, once can make a strong argument that Congress should have a
role in any action that involves “changing the law itself.”39
Finally, the “fundamental separation of powers considerations,
which underwrite the Court’s narrow construction of congressional
power over appointments, are entirely inapt when applied to the
treaty power.”40 Unlike appointments, treaty-making is not “a core ex-
ecutive function”41 and therefore does not invoke the same separation
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
37. Treaty Termination Hearings, supra note 1, at 32 (prepared statement of Professor
Arthur Bestor, University of Washington).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
39. Sabis, supra note 3, at 240.
40. David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1847 (1998).
For an in-depth critique of why the appointment rationale cannot be applied to treaties,
see id. at 1846–60.
41. Id. at 1847; accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton) (“For if
we attend carefully to its [treaty power] operation, it will be found to partake more of the
legislative than of executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the
definition of either of them.”). But see Nelson, supra note 1, at 887 (“Inasmuch as the
making of treaties pertains to the conduct of foreign relations, distinctly an executive
power, much of Chief Justice Taft’s argument in Myers can be applied with equal cogency
to support an unlimited power of treaty termination by the President.”); Moriarty, supra
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of powers concerns.42 “Consequently, no emanation from the Treaty
Clause can underwrite a Myers-like strict rule of construction, ruling
out a priori any congressional participation in agreement-making as
an infringement on the essential powers of the executive.”43 Impor-
tantly, in Goldwater v. Carter, the seminal case on treaty termination,
both the D.C. District Court44 and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals45
rejected the appellee’s argument that Myers should be controlling in
deciding the treaty termination issue. None of the five separate opin-
ions in the Supreme Court touched on the issue, though the Justices
clashed over its relevance in oral argument.46 While not binding, the
district and appellate decisions in Goldwater are therefore the only two
court decisions on the topic and both call into question the assump-
tion that Myers would be controlling.47
Both a direct and indirect analysis of the Constitution’s text as
well as an examination of the Framers’ intent leaves unresolved the
question of whether Congress can unilaterally terminate a treaty.
Therefore, one must turn to an analysis of how the issue has been
understood by commentators and practitioners historically and today;
“the Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of
power . . . is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing
American foreign policy.”48 This Article focuses on a part of this strug-
gle, analyzing the ways in which Congress might assert its role in the
treaty termination process even in the face of Executive opposition.
note 15, at 163 (“[T]he burden is on the President to show that the decision as to whether
or not notice should be delivered is an area of sole executive authority.”).
42. In this way, congressional influence over the treaty process would be more analo-
gous to its influence over quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial appointees which the Court
upheld in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
43. Golove, supra note 40, at 1847–48.
44. Goldwater I, 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C.) (“An attempt to justify a unilateral
presidential power to terminate treaties by analogy to the Supreme Court’s treatment of
the removal power in Myers is unpersuasive.”), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
45. Goldwater v. Carter (Goldwater II), 617 F.2d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir.) (“Expansion of
the language of the Constitution by sequential linguistic projection is a tricky business at
best. Virtually all constitutional principles have unique elements and can be distinguished
from one another.”), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
46. See Sabis, supra note 3, at 240.
47. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the likelihood that a court would be willing to hear a
treaty termination case today).
48. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1948, HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION 208 (3d ed. 1948).
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II. The Recent Focus on the Executive Acting Unilaterally
For the last thirty years, the treaty termination debate has focused
on whether a President can unilaterally terminate a treaty without
congressional or senatorial approval. This Article inverts that ques-
tion, but a brief discussion of the question of unilateral executive
power is necessary to both inform and underpin this Article’s
discussion.
President Johnson controversially came within twenty-four hours
of terminating U.S. participation in the Warsaw Convention in 1965,49
but the debate about a President’s power to terminate treaties did not
begin in full until President Carter unilaterally terminated the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan in 1978.50 Presi-
dent Carter’s claim to a unilateral termination power was grounded
first in precedent; he cited both historical academic support51 as well
as real-world examples of a President’s ability to unilaterally terminate
treaties without congressional consent.52 However, a number of schol-
ars have persuasively argued that none of the precedent cited by Presi-
dent Carter support a President’s unilateral termination power.53
President Carter’s reliance on a historical tradition of broad exec-
utive power in foreign affairs was more widely accepted.54 The Su-
49. See, e.g., Comment, Presidential Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the
Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 580 (1967) [hereinafter Presidential Amendment and
Termination of Treaties].
50. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the
United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2264 (Dec. 15,
1978).
51. See Memorandum from Herbert J. Hansel, Legal Adviser, to Cyrus Vance, Sec’y of
State, Re: President’s Power to Give Notice of Termination of U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense
Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978), in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., TERMINA-
TION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF POWER 395, 395–97 (Comm. Print.
1979).
52. See id. at 397–98.
53. See Jonathan York Thomas, The Abuse of History: A Refutation of the State Department
Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty Termination, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 27, 79 (1979) (arguing that none of the thirteen examples support a claim for
presidential power); David J. Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United
States De-Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 931, 979–86 (1978) (same).
Even Professor Henkin, a strong supporter of the President’s power to terminate treaties
unilaterally has cautioned against reliance on these precedents. See Henkin, supra note 34,
at 651 (“But looking to the precedents alone is misleading, especially since many of them
are old, antedating the development of clear lines of constitutional authority in foreign
affairs.”).
54. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913) (upholding unilateral presi-
dential power to determine when a treaty has been breached by the other side). But see In
re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821) (holding that a President cannot
unilaterally amend a treaty).
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preme Court has recognized that “the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”55 Furthermore,
the President is the “sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress.”56 While this argument was initially
controversial, over the last thirty years it has been widely accepted by
academic commentators,57 the Restatement of Foreign Affairs,58 the
executive branch,59 as well as the Senate.60
The Supreme Court also appears sympathetic. In 1979, eight
members of the U.S. Senate, one former Senator, and sixteen Con-
gressmen sued President Carter in federal court to enjoin his termina-
55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
56. Id. at 320.
57. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2242 (1999) (“[T]oday most commentators,
courts and government entities accept that the President unilaterally may terminate trea-
ties.”); Henkin, supra note 34, at 652 (“Termination of a treaty is an international act, and
the President, and only the President, acts for the United States in foreign affairs.”).
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 339 (“Under the law of the United States, the Presi-
dent has the power (a) to suspend or terminate an agreement in accordance with its terms;
(b) to make the determination that would justify the United States in terminating or sus-
pending an agreement because of its violation by another party or because of supervening
events, and to proceed to terminate or suspend the agreement on behalf of the United
States; or (c) to elect in a particular case not to suspend or terminate an agreement.”).
Michael Glennon argues that this provision should be read to uphold a presidential power
to terminate treaties in compliance with international law and not to abrogate them in
violation thereof. See GLENNON, supra note 24, at 158–59. However, the Restatement does
not directly distinguish between terminating treaties in compliance with or in violation of
international law.
59. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Application of Treaties and
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees at 12, n.36 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://
www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf (“[T]he President’s power to
terminate treaties . . . has been accepted by practice and considered opinion of the three
branches . . . .” (citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Authority of the Presi-
dent to Denounce the ABM Treaty (Dec. 14, 2001))).
60. S. REP. NO. 96-119, at 9–10 (1979) (upholding President’s power to terminate a
treaty if it is in accordance with international law and the Senate has not expressed a con-
trary position); Treaties: The Senate’s Role in Treaties, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#5 (last visited Mar. 22, 2012); see
also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 201 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS
TREATY TERMINATION] (“Although the Congress can effectively terminate a treaty’s domes-
tic effect by passage of a superseding public law . . . the termination of the outstanding
international obligation seems to reside with the President since he alone is able to com-
municate with foreign powers.”).
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tion of the Mutual Defense Treaty.61 In a fractured set of opinions, the
Supreme Court dismissed the case, predominantly based on political
question62 and ripeness grounds.63 However, one Justice did reach the
merits: Justice Brennan’s opinion stated that he would have affirmed
the D.C. Circuit and upheld President Carter’s unilateral termination
of the treaty. As the only available data point regarding the Supreme
Court’s view of the President’s claim to a unilateral right to terminate
treaties, this case offers some persuasive, though nonbinding, support
for a President’s unilateral termination authority.64
There is thus support for the view that the President has the uni-
lateral authority to terminate a treaty. However, this support does not
help to answer this Article’s inquiry for a variety of reasons. First, even
if one were to accept that the executive has a unilateral termination
right, which as demonstrated above remains controversial, “the Presi-
dent has never been accorded an exclusive power to terminate trea-
ties.”65 For example, the Restatement only indicates that “the
President has the power . . . to suspend or terminate an agreement”
without giving any indication that another body might not also have
the same right.66
Second, the only Justice to reach the merits of the termination
issue in Goldwater based his decision on the President’s power to rec-
ognize and derecognize other governments,67 an alternative presiden-
tial power not likely to be relevant in many termination settings.
Finally, most commentators who argue that a President’s right to
terminate is exclusive base their opinions on the President’s recog-
61. Goldwater I, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), va-
cated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
62. Goldwater v. Carter (Goldwater III), 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
63. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[Termination is] a necessary incident to
Executive recognition of the Peking government. . . . Our cases firmly establish that the
Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recog-
nition from, foreign regimes.”).
65. Nelson, supra note 1, at 888 (emphasis in original).
66. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 339(a).
67. Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The language in the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion affirming the President’s unilateral authority was more general than that
used by Justice Brennan. See Goldwater II, 617 F.2d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979) (“[T]he power of the President to terminate may appear theoretically abso-
lute”). However, the court explicitly limited its holding to the facts before it, reserving the
question of a President’s authority to terminate other treaties. Id. at 699 (“The constitu-
tional issue we face, therefore, is solely and simply the one of whether the President in these
precise circumstances is, on behalf of the United States, empowered to terminate the Treaty
in accordance with its terms.” (emphasis added)).
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nized role as the sole representative of the United States in foreign
affairs.68 However, as the next section of this Article will endeavor to
show, while this argument might limit Congress’ ability to directly de-
liver notice of the United States’ withdrawal, it does not necessarily
preclude Congress from passing legislation that directs the President
to give the requisite notification. Thus, there remains an open ques-
tion of whether Congress has the authority to unilaterally terminate
treaties. The following sections of this Article address this gap.
III. Congress’ Independent Options to Influence the
Termination of Treaties
This section will analyze each of the conceivable ways by which
either house of Congress, acting separately or together, might inde-
pendently influence the termination of a treaty.
A. Introduction
The varied practice of the United States in terminating treaties
over its history provides precedent for several of these methods.69 This
section will argue that the only defensible means by which Congress
could independently terminate a treaty without infringing on the
President’s constitutional authority is by passing legislation, presuma-
bly over a presidential veto, directing the President to give the requi-
site notice of termination. All other methods either require
presidential involvement or are patently unconstitutional.
As an initial matter, two of the theoretically possible avenues by
which either the House or Senate could act can be quickly disposed
of. First, as opposed to the Senate, to which the Constitution grants
several independent powers regarding foreign affairs, the House of
Representatives acting independently has no constitutional authority.
Independently, the House can only pass a House resolution, which “is
68. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 34, at 652 (“Termination of a treaty is an international
act, and the President, and only the President, acts for the United States in foreign af-
fairs.”); CRS TREATY TERMINATION, supra note 60, at 201 (“Although the Congress can effec-
tively terminate a treaty’s domestic effect by passage of a superseding public law . . . the
termination of an outstanding international obligation seems to reside with the President
since he alone is able to communicate with foreign powers.”).
69. See, e.g., Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 1005 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting the
varied historical practice of the U.S. in treaty termination); HENKIN, supra note 10, at 211
(“At various times, the power to terminate treaties has been claimed for the President, for
the President-and-Senate, for President-and-Congress, [and] for Congress.”); Moriarty,
supra note 15, at 129 (“Treaties have been terminated throughout the history of the United
States in many different ways . . . .”).
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not binding upon the President” and the President may therefore
“comply with or ignore the resolution as he sees fit.”70 While the
House has from time to time argued for a greater role in foreign af-
fairs, its exclusion was deliberate on the part of the Framers, who be-
lieved that the quick turnover of Representatives would not be
conducive to successful foreign policy.71
Second, a concurrent resolution, passed by both houses of Con-
gress but not signed by the President, has no constitutional author-
ity.72 While such an action would presumably be sufficient to
demonstrate either Congress’ support for the President73 or its oppo-
sition, thereby creating a case or controversy “ripe” for judicial deter-
mination,74 the President can “heed or ignore a concurrent resolution
of the two Houses.”75 A concurrent resolution is therefore a constitu-
tionally insufficient mechanism for Congress to terminate a treaty.
B. Two-thirds of the Senate Acting Independently
A strong argument can be made that treaties should be termi-
nated in the same way as they are made: by a two-thirds vote of the
Senate.76 Historically, this method has been relied upon several times.
The first instance appears to have been in 1855 when the Senate
unanimously passed a resolution authorizing President Pierce to give
Denmark notice of U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty of Friendship,
70. Nelson, supra note 1, at 892.
71. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (“They who wish to commit the power
under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and
going in quick succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inade-
quate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated
in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved
by measures which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are
necessary to concert and to execute.”).
72. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983) (reaffirming the constitutional
requirement that legislation must pass through bicameralism and presentment before it
has the force of law).
73. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has argued that if both Houses of
Congress demonstrate their support for termination, which could be accomplished by con-
current resolution, the President has the constitutional capacity to unilaterally terminate a
treaty. S. REP. NO. 96-119, at 9–10 (1979).
74. In Goldwater III, Justice Powell voted to dismiss the case and vacate the District
Court’s decision on ripeness grounds, because Congress had yet to take any “official ac-
tion.” Presumably therefore, if each branch were to take “action asserting its constitutional
authority” thereby creating an “actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches” there would be a justiciable case or controversy. Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 997–98
(Powell, J., concurring).
75. Nelson, supra note 1, at 892.
76. U.S. CONST. art. 2, §. 2, cl. 2.
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Commerce, and Navigation with Denmark.77 President Pierce subse-
quently gave “the notice ‘in pursuance of the authority conferred’ by
the Senate Resolution.”78 After the House complained of its exclu-
sion, arguing that its constitutional role in the creation of law had
been bypassed, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations studied
the issue and issued a report concluding:
[T]he Committee are clear in the opinion that it is competent for
the President and Senate, acting together, to terminate in the man-
ner prescribed by the 11th article, without the aid or intervention
of legislation by Congress, and that when so terminated, it is at an
end to every intent, both as a contract between the governments,
and as a law of the land.79
This method was again used when President Wilson sought to termi-
nate the International Sanitary Convention of 1903, and also sought,
and received, support from two-thirds of the Senate.80 In the 1979
dispute over President Carter’s termination of the 1954 Mutual De-
fense Treaty, the Senate appeared to reaffirm its support for this
method, introducing at least two resolutions calling for the President
to refrain from acting until he received the Senate’s advice and con-
sent to the treaty’s termination.81 Furthermore, there is historical sup-
port for this approach from the courts (in dicta),82 several of the
77. S. REP. NO. 34-97, at 2 (1856); see also General Convention of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation, U.S.-Den., Apr. 26, 1826, 8 Stat. 340.
78. Emerson, supra note 23, at 54.
79. S. REP. NO. 34-97, at 3. Two years later, the Senate went further, changing a Joint
Resolution passed by the House into a simple Senate Resolution authorizing the President
to withdraw from a commercial treaty with Hanover. Emerson, supra note 23, at 55.
80. See CRS TREATY TERMINATION, supra note 60, at 205 (“By a resolution adopted by a
two-thirds majority on May 26, 1921, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the denunci-
ation of the convention; and the Secretary of State communicated notice of the denuncia-
tion to the convention’s depositary.”).
81. See S. Con. Res. 2, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 474 (1979) (“Resolved by the Senate
(the House of Representatives concurring), That, in accordance with the separation of powers
under the Constitution, the President should not unilaterally abrogate, denounce or other-
wise terminate, give notice of intention to terminate, alter, or suspend any of the security
treaties comprising the post-World War II complex of treaties, including mutual defense
treaties, without the advice and consent of the Senate, which was involved in their initial
ratification, or the approval of both Houses of Congress.”); S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., 125
CONG. REC. 475 (1979) (“Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that approval of the
United States Senate is required to terminate any Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and another nation.”). The Resolution was approved in committee but never
received a vote on the Senate floor as a result of the objection of Senator Robert C. Byrd.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947) (“[The] President and Senate
may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life.” (quoting Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E.
185, 192 (1920))); In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821) (“[T]he
obligations of the treaty could not be changed or varied but by the same formalities with
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Founders,83 the State Department,84 as well as from a number of mod-
ern commentators.85
Despite this widespread support, a number of counterarguments
have been raised. First, most of its apparent support is derived from
juridical dicta and academic commentators, offering little in prece-
dential value. Practically speaking, this termination method does not
appear to have been used in an actual treaty termination in over fifty
years. Relying only on the previous precedents “is misleading, espe-
cially since many of them are old, antedating the development of clear
lines of constitutional authority in foreign affairs.”86 Second, the Con-
stitution provides very few powers directly to the Senate, leading schol-
ars not to infer “any powers for the Senate (as distinguished from
Congress) other than those specified.”87 Third, as discussed above, in
the executive appointment context the Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected the argument that the constitutional authority to take an ac-
tion necessarily implies the power to repeal or reverse that action.88
The Court has granted the Executive almost untrammeled authority
to remove executive officials, despite the role the Senate is granted in
their confirmation. Given the textual similarities between the appoint-
which they were introduced, or at least by some act of as high an import, and of as unequiv-
ocal an authority.”).
83. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (“[T]hey who make treaties may alter
or cancel them.”); RAMSEY, supra note 1, at 159 (“It is a general principle in law, as well in
reason, that there shall be the same authority to remove as to establish.” (quoting Roger
Sherman)).
84. 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 509, at 316
(1927) (“[T]he power that makes the treaty can likewise revoke it; in other words, that the
President, acting in conjunction with the Senate of the United States, would be authorized
to terminate a treaty to which the United States is a party.” (quoting Memorandum of
Scott, Solicitor, Dep’t of State (June 12, 1909))).
85. See, e.g., Bestor, supra note 19, at 135 (reviewing the history of the treaty clause in
order to conclude that “treatymaking was to be a cooperative venture from the beginning
to the end of the entire process. This, the evidence shows, was the true intent of the fram-
ers.”); Moriarty, supra note 15, at 132–33; Nelson, supra note 1, at 888 (“Practice and opin-
ion in the United States also supports the view that treaties should be terminated as they
are made, i.e., by the President and the Senate acting as the ‘treaty-making’ power of the
United States.”); Scheffer, supra note 53, at 1008–09 (“Given the peculiar design of the
United States Constitution, whereby the Senate and President share in the treaty-making
power, there is much to be said for a court-approved procedure requiring Senate participa-
tion in the termination process.”).
86. Henkin, supra note 34, at 651.
87. Id. at 652–53; accord RAMSEY, supra note 1, at 159 (“[T]he text gave the Senate a
role in treatymaking. It did not give the Senate a role in treaty withdrawal, so that power
remained part of the President’s executive power.”).
88. See supra Part I.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Myers that the Sen-
ate’s authority to provide its advice and consent for appointments did not imply an equal
authority in removals).
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ment and termination provisions, it is thus questionable whether a
court would ever uphold a Senate role in the termination of a treaty
simply because the Constitution granted them authority over
ratification.
Finally, and most importantly in the context of this Article, the
Senate can make no claim that it could force a recalcitrant President
to terminate a treaty even with a two-thirds majority.89 Any role that
the Senate independently might possess is inferred from its power
over treaty ratification, a power that itself requires presidential ap-
proval. Presidential opposition to a treaty’s termination would render
precatory any resolution supporting such an action passed only by a
Senate supermajority.
C. Both Houses of Congress Acting Jointly to Independently
Notify Foreign States of a Treaty’s Termination
Congress has no constitutional authority to independently termi-
nate a treaty when it acts through a concurrent resolution or through
either house individually. The only means by which Congress can con-
stitutionally enact legislation is by acting jointly and passing legislation
through the rigors of bicameralism and presentment, thereby incor-
porating the president’s support or overcoming his veto.
Congress has two potential means of acting jointly to terminate a
treaty. The first, and seemingly simplest option, would be to pass legis-
lation purporting to terminate the United States’ treaty involvement.
This may have been the option at the forefront of the Founders
minds, as the first treaty termination in U.S. history was accomplished
solely by congressional joint resolution. On July 7, 1798, the fifth Con-
gress passed an act entitled “An act to declare the treaties heretofore
concluded with France no longer obligatory on the United States,”
whose operating paragraph90 read in full:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of
89. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 15, at 137–38.
90. The prefatory language of the Act read:
Whereas, the treaties concluded between the United States and France have been
repeatedly violated on the part of the French government; and the just claims of
the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused,
and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between
the two nations have been repelled with indignity; And whereas, under authority
of the French government, there is yet pursued against the United States a system
of predatory violence, infracting the said treaties, and hostile to the rights of a
free and independent nation . . . .
Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578.
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right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties,
and of the consular convention, heretofore concluded between the
United States and France; and that the same shall not henceforth
be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of
the United States.91
While President Adams signed the act, the bill’s language indicates
that Congress itself was terminating U.S. involvement in a series of
four commercial treaties with France. The bill does not direct the
President to notify France of the United States’ termination, it simply
assumes that Congress’ action alone is sufficient to end the United
States’ international obligations. While this might have been inter-
preted as an anomaly of the founding, almost one hundred years later
the Supreme Court upheld Congress’ actions, declaring that “[i]n
1798 the conduct towards this country of the government of France
was of such a character that Congress declared that the United States
were freed and exonerated from the stipulations of previous treaties
with that country.”92 France did, however, refuse to recognize Con-
gress’ abrogation.93
Despite its assertive beginning, Congress does not appear to have
passed a bill repeating its 1798 efforts. Several such bills were pro-
posed during the debates over the Yalta Agreement in 1953, but none
of them passed the House of Representatives.94 In the judicial branch,
there is some obscure language in several court opinions that could
be read as an affirmation of the constitutionality of such an ap-
proach,95 though the precedential value of such historical dicta is low.
91. Id.
92. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 601 (1889); see also Hooper v.
United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 418 (1887) (“The annulling act issued from competent au-
thority and was the official act of the Government of the United States. So far as it was
within the power of one party to abrogate these treaties it was indisputably done by the Act
of July 7, 1798.”); see also Sabis, supra note 3, at 235 (“In rendering its decision, the court of
claims [in Hooper] held Congress was the correct U.S. authority to abrogate a treaty and
had properly issued the terminating act, apparently on the grounds that a treaty was the
supreme law of the land and thus, a legislative Act was needed for its termination.”).
93. See CRS TREATY TERMINATION, supra note 60, at 207 (citing 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE,
A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 608 et seq. (1906)).
94. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 895 n.72 (listing the various bills that were introduced
and what would have been the effect of their language).
95. In dicta, the Supreme Court has referred affirmatively to a congressional authority
to terminate U.S. international commitments. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32
(1982) (“We think that some affirmative expression of congressional intent to abrogate the
United States’ international obligations is required in order to construe the word ‘treaty’
in §106 as meaning only Art. II treaties.” (emphasis added)); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (“If Congress, therefore, (who, I conceive, alone have such authority
under our Government) shall make such a declaration, in any case like the present, I shall
deem it my duty to regard the treaty as void . . . .”); see also Ropes v. Clinch, 20 F. Cas. 1171,
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Nevertheless, while Congress’ actions in 1798 were widely ac-
cepted at the time, the consensus has quickly shifted to supporting the
President as the exclusive representative of the United States in for-
eign countries. Indeed, this view had developed as early as 1816, when
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (“SFRC”) indicated that
“[t]he President is the constitutional representative of the United
States with regard to foreign nations.”96 By 1911, the Chairman of the
SFRC, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, conceded that Senate and Con-
gress should “remember that it does not lie in our hands alone to give
this notice to a foreign Government. We can not give the notice.”97 In
1929, a prominent academic commentator applied this consensus to
the treaty termination debate, concluding that “Congress has no
means whereby it may itself give a notice of termination of a treaty to
the foreign government concerned, for, under the Constitution, Con-
gress has no power to communicate directly with foreign Powers.”98
Today, the “President alone has the power to speak or listen as a rep-
resentative of the nation . . . . ‘The President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.’”99 As such, Congress cannot independently communicate
with foreign nations, nor can it purport to drive policy by any means
other than through the President. Foreign states themselves are pre-
sumed to know that only the President and his representatives100 are
authorized to speak on behalf of the United States.101 Modern com-
1174 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (“There are three modes in which congress may practically yet
efficiently annul or destroy the operative effect of any treaty with a foreign country. They
may do it by giving the notice which the treaty contemplates shall be given before it shall
be abrogated, in cases in which, like the present, such a notice was provided for; or, if the
terms of the treaty require no such notice, they may do it by the formal abrogation of the
treaty at once, by express terms . . . .”).
96. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
97. 48 CONG. REC. 480 (1911) (statement of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge).
98. 1 WILLOUGHBY, 2d ed., supra note 8, § 324, at 587.
99. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613
(1800)).
100. Representatives are those individuals to whom the President has delegated consti-
tutional authority, e.g., members of the Executive branch. The clearest examples would be
the Secretary of State and the U.S. ambassadors. For the purposes of concluding an inter-
national agreement, the Restatement provides that only persons who “produce[ ] full pow-
ers” are authorized to represent a state. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 311(2)(a) & cmt.
b. The U.S. practice with respect to the delegation of authority was originally laid out in
“Circular 175,” a 1955 U.S. State Department Circular that “prescrib[ed] a process for
prior coordination and approval of international agreements.” See Circular 175 Procedure,
U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/ (last visited May 14, 2012). The cur-
rent practice is codified at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 and described on the State Department’s
website. Id.
101. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 311(2)(b) & cmt. b.
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mentators have almost universally come to accept this view.102
Through this lens, Congress’ action in 1798 is the anomaly. Professor
Henkin explains this discrepancy by noting that Congress has previ-
ously justified independent action through a different conception of
the relationship between treaty abrogation and the likelihood of war
than exists today. “In earlier times . . . the maintenance or termination
of treaties” was seen as “intimately related to war or peace for which
Congress has primary responsibility.”103 Indeed, Congress’ actions in
1798 were subsequently interpreted by the courts as having amounted
to a declaration of war against France.104 If treaty terminations are
seen as declarations of war, then Congress can justify an independent
role based on its express constitutional delegation of power in the
declaration of war.105 Today, Congress likely has the constitutional au-
thority to give “the requisite notice to a foreign nation that it is termi-
nating a treaty when it is doing so pursuant to its power to declare
war,”106 an authority even the Executive Branch concedes.107
However, the creation and abrogation of treaties is no longer
considered to be as intimately connected with matters of war and
peace as it was in 1798. For example, in 2001, President Bush termi-
nated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (“ABM”) Treaty, a bilateral arms con-
trol treaty that had served as one of the foundations of peace during
102. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 10, at 213 (“Congressional resolutions have no effect
internationally unless the President adopts and communicates them; some Presidents have
chosen to comply with Congressional wishes, but others have disregarded them.”); Mori-
arty, supra note 15, at 148 (“The vast majority of commentators who have spoken on the
subject have concluded that Congress has no independent power to give foreign nations
notice of termination, if the President refused to do so.”); Scheffer, supra note 53, at 991
(“There is no dispute as to which authority is to actually deliver notice of termination . . . it
is the President. A Senate or congressional attempt to deliver the notice of termination
would risk severe constitutional censure.”).
103. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 213. Professor Henkin cites to Congress’ 1798 termina-
tion, discussed supra Part III.C, as one of his examples. See id. at 213 n.143.
104. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
106. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 148; accord Presidential Amendment and Termination of
Treaties, supra note 49, at 600 (“[Congress’] . . . right to give notice of denunciation to
other countries . . . has since been restricted to declarations pursuant to war.”). But see
ADLER, supra note 2, at 157 (arguing that even this power no longer exists).
107. Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements that Substantially Modify the
United States’ Obligations Under an Existing Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C. 389, 396 n.17 (1996)
(“A declaration of war is a legislative act that can have the effect of abrogating a treaty in
whole or in part. . . . Accordingly, it is at least arguable that Congress’ war power enables it
to enact legislation, other than a formal declaration of war, that authorizes the President to
vary the United States’ obligations under disarmament or other political-military
treaties.”).
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the Cold War.108 Its termination was controversial, but no one in ei-
ther country construed it as a possible declaration of war. If terminat-
ing the ABM Treaty did not produce such a reaction, there are few
treaties that would. Congress today would thus not be able to justify a
treaty termination power based on its war declaration power.109
As discussed above, the only means by which Congress can consti-
tutionally compel action is through legislation constitutionally en-
acted through bicameralism and presentment. Yet, even via such
legislation, Congress cannot independently communicate with foreign
states as the President is the only authority constitutionally empow-
ered to do so. This precludes Congress from directly notifying foreign
governments of the United States’ termination, but it leaves open one
final possibility for action, discussed in the next section.
D. Both Houses of Congress Acting Jointly to Direct the President
to Deliver the Notification of Termination to Foreign
States
While the previous section demonstrated that Congress cannot
itself directly communicate with foreign states, this section will analyze
“whether Congress has the right to legislate that a treaty shall be ter-
minated, and by such legislation . . . demand that the President de-
liver notice of termination pursuant to his duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed.”110
1. Argument in Favor of a Congressional Power to Direct a
President to Terminate a Treaty with a Foreign State
Historically, legislation authorizing or directing the President to
terminate a treaty “has been the most common method employed by
the Congress and acted upon by the President.”111 While most of
these terminations have been cooperative, with both Congress and the
President supporting the treaty’s termination, this section will en-
108. Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1783 (Dec. 13, 2001).
109. The D.C. Circuit went further in Goldwater II, arguing that treaty terminations
should be treated as a singular power and not differentiated based on the subject of the
treaty, thereby rejecting a congressional argument for termination power only in war set-
tings. See Goldwater II, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (“There
is no judicially ascertainable and manageable method of making any distinction among
treaties on the basis of their substance, the magnitude of the risk involved, the degree of
controversy which their termination would engender, or by any other standards. We know
of no standards to apply in making such distinctions.”).
110. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 156.
111. Scheffer, supra note 53, at 997; accord Moriarty, supra note 15, at 140 n.87.
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deavor to show that Congress has the constitutional capacity to direct
even a recalcitrant President to deliver the notification of a treaty’s
termination.
The principle justification for this argument is the President’s
constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”112 As the head of the Executive Branch, the President is
charged with executing the laws enacted by Congress. While the Presi-
dent has the ability to veto legislation, if that legislation is subse-
quently passed over his veto,113 he is constitutionally required to
enforce it. The Constitution’s text permits no discretion; the Presi-
dent is required to enforce all enacted legislation equally and cannot
do so piecemeal, discriminating between those provisions he wishes to
execute and those he does not.
In the context of the treaty termination debate, if Congress passes
legislation requiring the President to deliver termination notification
to a foreign state, “the President may actually be required to terminate
a treaty in order to uphold his constitutional duty.”114 As Professor
Henkin has written, when enacted legislation is clearly intended to be
mandatory on the President “it is difficult to build a persuasive argu-
ment that ‘He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’
gives him discretion not to execute them.”115 Nor is there any reason
to believe that this duty is “weaker, or different, in respect of laws that
govern or impinge on foreign relations.”116
The first apparent instance of Congress acting via this procedure
was on April 27, 1846 when Congress authorized President Polk, in
response to President Polk’s request for such authority, to provide no-
tice of U.S. withdrawal from a treaty with Great Britain granting
shared occupancy of the Oregon Territory.117 The second was in 1883
when Congress directed President Arthur to terminate a treaty with
Britain using language representative of that used throughout the
nineteenth century: “the President be, and he hereby is, directed to
give notice to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that the provi-
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
113. For the purposes of this section, assume that any reference to legislation that has
been passed in an attempt to force an opposed President to act, was duly enacted into law,
whether over a presidential veto or his unwilling signature.
114. Nancy J. Murray, Comment, Treaty Termination by the President Without Senate or Con-
gressional Approval: The Case of the Taiwan Treaty, 33 SW. L.J. 729, 743 (1979).
115. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 118 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
116. Id.
117. H.R.J. Res. 4, 29th Cong., 9 Stat. 109 (1846) (enacted); see also Emerson, supra
note 23, at 53.
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sions . . . will terminate and be of no force on the expiration of two
years next after the time of giving such notice.”118
While the Supreme Court seemed to uphold the practice several
times in passing during the nineteenth century,119 in 1936 it directly
addressed the constitutionality of Congress’ attempt to terminate a
treaty.120 Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Company arose out of a chal-
lenge to a statute passed by Congress in 1915, which “expressed ‘the
judgment of Congress’ that treaty provisions in conflict with the provi-
sions of the act ‘ought to be terminated,’ and the President was ‘re-
quested and directed’ to give notice to that effect to the several
governments concerned.”121 In compliance with the Act’s direction,
President Wilson terminated a number of treaties between 1915 and
1918 that conflicted with its provisions.122 The Court was confronted
with the limited issue of whether the Executive had the authority to
terminate the treaty in question, and ultimately held that the Presi-
dent had a duty to abide by the dictates of the congressional statute:
In this instance, the Congress requested and directed the President
to give notice of the termination of the treaty provisions in conflict
with the Act. From every point of view, it was incumbent upon the
President, charged with the conduct of negotiations with foreign
governments and also with the duty to take care that the laws of the
United States are faithfully executed, to reach a conclusion as to
the inconsistency between the provisions of the treaty and the pro-
visions of the new law.123
While one contemporaneous scholar argued that the Van Der Weyde
Court “did not state squarely that Congress could direct the President
to terminate a treaty,”124 the Court’s argument that “it was incumbent
118. H.R.J. Res. 22, 47th Cong., 22 Stat. 641 (1883) (enacted).
119. See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (“[W]e are
of opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can
become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such
acts as congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.” (emphasis added));
La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899) (“Congress by legisla-
tion . . . could abrogate a treaty . . . .”).
120. As was true throughout the nineteenth century, the treaty terminations in ques-
tion were supported by both the legislative and executive branches working cooperatively.
As such, the courts were not confronted with the question at issue in this paper, and subse-
quently addressed in Goldwater III, regarding which branch had the constitutional authority
to terminate the treaty when the other branch stood in opposition. See Goldwater III, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
121. Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297 U.S. 114, 116 (1936) (quoting Seamen’s
Act, ch. 153, § 16, 38 Stat. 1164, 1184 (1915)).
122. Id. at 116 & n.3.
123. Id. at 117–18 (emphasis added).
124. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations:
Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 647 (1937).
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upon the President” prescribes an unambiguous duty to abide by Con-
gress’ directive.125
More recently, Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Goldwa-
ter noted that Congress has “resources available to protect and assert
its interests” against Executive encroachment,126 and cited as an exam-
ple the lower court’s discussion of Congress’ practice of initiating “the
termination of treaties by directing or requiring the President to give
notice of termination.”127 While Justice Rehnquist’s decision was non-
binding, presumably, if Congress’ practice of so directing the Presi-
dent was unconstitutional, Justice Rehnquist would not have
affirmatively cited to it. As a result, while Rehnquist’s citation is insuffi-
cient to establish the practice’s constitutionality, especially given that
the cases to which he cites involved Congress and the President work-
ing in cooperation,128 it does serve as evidence that congressional di-
rection is not patently unconstitutional.
2. Arguments Against a Congressional Power to Direct a President
to Terminate a Treaty with a Foreign State
Several commentators have however raised a number of counter-
arguments, grounded in either historical precedent or constitutional
authority, to a congressional authority to direct the President to act.
This section will introduce, and then rebut, a series of these
counterarguments.
125. Van der Weyde, 297 U.S. at 118.
126. Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
127. Id. at n.1 (quoting Goldwater I, 481 F. Supp. 949, 958 (D.D.C. 1979) (Wright, C.J.,
concurring)).
128. Chief Judge Wright cited three resolutions in his concurring opinion in Goldwater
II: H.R.J. Res. 6, 38th Cong., 13 Stat. 566 (1865) (enacted) (“[P]roviding for the Termina-
tion of the Reciprocity Treaty of fifth June, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, between the
United States and Great Britain.”); H.R.J. Res. 10, 43d Cong., 18 Stat. 287 (1874) (enacted)
(“[P]roviding for the termination of the treaty between the United States and His Majesty
the King of the Belgians, concluded at Washington, July seventeenth, eighteen hundred
and fifty-eight.”); H.R.J. Res. 22, 47th Cong., 22 Stat. 641 (1883) (enacted) (“[P]roviding
for the termination of articles numbered eighteen to twenty-five, inclusive, and article
numbered thirty of the treaty between the United States of America and Her Brittanic
Majesty, concluded at Washington, May eighth, eighteen hundred and seventy-one.”).
Goldwater II, 617 F.2d 697, 715 n.21 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). These stat-
utes were arguably incorporated by reference by Justice Rehnquist when he cited Chief
Judge Wright’s opinion. See Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 1004 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(citing Goldwater II, 617 F.2d at 715–16 (Wright, J., concurring)).
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a. Historical Examples
Despite this apparent support, a number of commentators have
argued that “the President cannot be forced by Congress or by the
Senate to perform the international act of giving notice.”129 These
commentators begin their arguments by citing to historical practice in
which several Presidents have refused to deliver termination notices to
foreign countries after Congress had directed them to do so. How-
ever, none of the examples typically cited supports the claim that a
President can ignore congressional directives.
The chronologically first example, cited by Professor Henkin, is
when “[President] Lincoln ignored Congressional directions to termi-
nate the Rush-Bagot Agreement disarming the Great Lakes.”130 At
first, this example appears to support Professor Henkin’s claim. On
February 9, 1865, Congress passed a resolution directing the President
to notify Great Britain of the United States’ desire to terminate the
Rush-Bagot Agreement regulating the use of naval forces on the Great
Lakes.131 President Lincoln never delivered the notification and the
Rush-Bagot Agreement exists to this day,132 seemingly demonstrating
a President’s effort to ignore a congressional directive.
129. Jesse S. Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J. INT’L LAW 33,
38 (1921); see also 1 WILLOUGHBY, 2d ed., supra note 8, § 324, at 587; Scheffer, supra note
53, at 981 (“The allocation of treaty termination powers has always recognized the Presi-
dent’s discretion to refuse to deliver notice of termination to a foreign country.”); HENKIN,
supra note 10, at 214 n.* (“[A] President who wishes to maintain a treaty will doubtless
treat a Congressional denunciation or directive to terminate it as only a hortatory ‘sense
resolution.’”). This claim is difficult to reconcile, a task Henkin leaves unaddressed, with a
claim he makes earlier in the same book:
[O]ther laws . . . [a]re clearly intended to be mandatory and, as to these, it is
difficult to build a persuasive argument that ‘He shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed’ gives him discretion not to execute them. There is little to
support the view that the President’s duty is weaker, or different, in respect of
laws that govern or impinge on foreign relations. Presidential authority not to
execute some Congressional mandates would have to be found in some other
constitutional power: the argument might be that Congress cannot impose for-
eign policy on the President, and that the President’s ‘primacy’ in foreign rela-
tions gives him special discretion as to whether and how to execute laws or spend
money relating to foreign affairs. The argument goes against explicit, unambigu-
ous constitutional text; it is not persuasive.
Id. at 117–18 (footnotes omitted).
130. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 491 n.143.
131. H.R.J. Res. 18, 38th Cong., 13 Stat. 568 (1865) (enacted); see also Henry Sherman
Boutell, Is the Rush-Bagot Convention Immortal?, 173 N. AM. REV. 331, 340–41 (1901).
132. See, e.g., U.S. Puts Machine-Guns on Great Lakes Coast Guard Vessels, CBC NEWS (Mar.
15, 2006), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2006/03/15/coastguard-060315.html
(discussing how the U.S. and Canada had agreed to reinterpret the “antiquated” Rush-
Bagot treaty to permit limited armaments for customs purposes).
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However, Congress’ action in February 1865 was not the first step
in the process. Earlier, President Lincoln had endeavored to unilater-
ally terminate the treaty.133 Congress’ action was meant as an ex post
ratification of the earlier presidential action:
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the notice given by the
President of the United States to the Government of Great Britain
and Ireland to terminate the treaty of eighteen hundred and seven-
teen, regulating the naval force upon the lake, is hereby adopted
and ratified as if the same had been authorized by Congress.134
President Lincoln’s six-month notice had been delivered on Novem-
ber 23, 1864 and would therefore have taken effect in the middle of
May 1865.135 However, by March of 1865, after General Sherman’s
successful March to the Sea, the Battle of Nashville, and the encircle-
ment of General Lee’s forces at Petersburg, the Union’s position in
the Civil War had changed dramatically. With victory almost certain,
President Lincoln now saw the continuation of the treaty as in the
United States’ best interests, and on March 8, 1865 Secretary of State
Seward notified Great Britain that the United States was withdrawing
its notice of termination.136 As a result, the episode is not an example
of a presidential refusal to abide by a congressional directive. Not only
were Congress’ actions only a post hoc ratification of the President’s
actions, but the President’s subsequent retraction of the notification
was motivated by drastically changed international circumstances and
not by any view as to his constitutional authority to ignore Congress.
A second example occasionally cited as proof that Presidents have
refused to abide by congressional directives to terminate treaties is
President Hayes’ 1897 veto of an act requiring him to terminate two
articles of the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 with China.137 President
Hayes’ veto was constitutionally based, as he argued that the power is
“not lodged by the Constitution in Congress, but in the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . .”138 Nevertheless,
this example also does not support the thesis. First, this was only a
presidential veto, which can be exercised on any grounds. The legisla-
133. Emerson, supra note 23, at 55.
134. H.R.J. Res. 18, 38th Cong., 13 Stat. 568 (1865) (enacted); see also Boutell, supra
note 131, at 339–42.
135. Boutell, supra note 131, at 340.
136. Id. at 341.
137. Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of An Act to Restrict the Immigration of Chinese to the
United States, 8 CONG. REC. 2275 (Mar. 1, 1879) [hereinafter Hayes Veto]; see also Emer-
son, supra note 23, at 56–57.
138. Hayes Veto, supra note 137.
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tion was never enacted and cannot thus represent evidence of a Presi-
dent having ignored a duly-enacted obligation. Second, and more
importantly, President Hayes viewed the congressional legislation as
amounting to an amendment of a treaty, a power he believed to lie
only in the President and Senate acting together.139 In fact, the Presi-
dent went so far as to argue that the “authority of Congress to termi-
nate a treaty with a foreign power by expressing the will of the nation
no longer to adhere to it is . . . free from controversy under our Con-
stitution.”140 This example thus supports, not undermines, this Arti-
cle’s thesis: that Congress has the power to direct the President to
terminate a treaty.
Finally, the most recent example, again cited by Professor Hen-
kin, is President Wilson ignoring “a directive in the Jones Act to termi-
nate certain conventions on customs and tonnage duties.”141 Section
34 of the Merchant Marine Act, better known as the Jones Act, passed
by Congress on June 5, 1920, directed the President to give notice that
the provisions of treaties that impose “any such restriction on the
United States will terminate on the expiration of such periods as may
be required for the giving of such notice.”142 President Wilson refused
to implement the provision, viewing it as an unconstitutional over-
reach by Congress; as his State Department explained, President Wil-
son “does not deem the direction contained in Section 34 of the so-
called Merchant Marine Act an exercise of any Constitutional power
possessed by the Congress.”143
However, just like the previous example, a closer reading indi-
cates that President Wilson believed the “law was not an effort to ter-
minate treaties . . . but to modify them, which Congress could not
do.”144 As the State Department Bulletin indicated, the congressional
action amounted to a termination of specific treaty provisions despite
the fact that the obligations were “mutual” and that “the treaties con-
tain no provisions for their termination in the manner contemplated
139. Emerson, supra note 23, at 57.
140. Hayes Veto, supra note 137.
141. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 213 n.143.
142. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 34, 41 Stat. 988, 1007.
143. Statement by State Department: Announcing President Wilson’s Refusal to Carry
Out the Section of the Jones Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920 (Sept. 24, 1920) [here-
inafter Statement by State Department], in 18 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1929, at 8871 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat’l Litera-
ture 1929) .
144. Emerson, supra note 23, at 59 (citations omitted).
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by Congress.”145 As a result, the episode is unrelated to the question
of treaty termination and again focuses merely on treaty modification.
None of these three examples provide evidence to support a
claim that a President has the discretion to ignore a congressional
directive requiring him to deliver notification to a foreign govern-
ment of treaty termination. With no reliable past practice, supporters
of a President’s discretion must rely solely on an ambiguous textual
analysis of the Constitution, to which this Article now turns.
b. The President’s Constitutional Authority to Refuse to Enforce
Unconstitutional Statutes
The second and more persuasive argument against Congress’
ability to direct the President to deliver the notice of a termination of
a treaty is the view that the “take care” clause does not obligate the
President to enforce unconstitutional statutes.146 The argument here
is predominantly practical; two-thirds of Congress should not be able
to force the President to execute an unconstitutional provision until
such time as he can challenge it in court. Judge Easterbrook makes
the point most clearly by example: If Congress were to enact a statute,
over a presidential veto, requiring the President to “execute the CEO
of Apex Missile Corporation,” the Constitution cannot reasonably be
read to require the President to carry out the action before he can
challenge it in court.147 Judge Easterbrook’s example does establish
that there may be “circumstances in which the President may appro-
priately decline to enforce a statute that he views as unconstitu-
tional.”148 The difficulty is in defining the scope of this authority; how
can one grant the President discretion not to enforce unconstitutional
statutes without granting him authority to independently adjudicate a
statute’s constitutionality?
Historically, Presidents have refused to enforce what they have
viewed as unconstitutional enactments. When signing bills, many Pres-
idents have attached signing statements indicating their unwillingness
to enforce provisions they viewed to be unconstitutional.149 In the for-
eign affairs context, every President since Richard Nixon has main-
145. Statement by State Department, supra note 143.
146. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905,
919–22 (1989–90) (arguing that the President is not constitutionally obligated to enforce
unconstitutional enactments).
147. Id. at 922.
148. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 199, 199 (1994).
149. See id. at 202.
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tained the view that the 1973 War Powers Resolution represents an
unconstitutional infringement on Executive power, though most have
“voluntarily” complied with its terms for political reasons.150 The Su-
preme Court has indirectly upheld this practice several times. In My-
ers, the majority opinion did not challenge the constitutionality of
President Wilson’s decision not to abide by the initial congressional
resolution, which he viewed as an unconstitutional infringement on
his rights, a position which the Supreme Court ultimately upheld.151
Similarly, in INS v. Chadha, the Court affirmatively cited to the presi-
dential practice of objecting to the constitutionality of provisions of a
broader piece of legislation they signed into law.152
Despite this apparent support, there are strong arguments against
a presidential power to independently assess a law’s constitutionality.
First, such a power would place the President in the role of both legis-
lator and judge. By claiming a power of constitutional review, the Pres-
ident could freely choose which statutes to enforce, usurping the
judiciary’s function until such time as he was challenged in court. The
House of Representatives has explained this problem in its analysis of
whether President Reagan had the constitutional authority to not ap-
ply provisions of the “Competition in Contracting Act”:
To adopt the view that one’s oath to support and defend the Con-
stitution is a license to exercise any available power in furtherance
of one’s own constitutional interpretation would quickly destroy
the entire constitutional scheme. Such a view, whereby the Presi-
dent pledges allegiance to the Constitution but then determines
what the Constitution means, inexorably leads to the usurpation by
the Executive of the others’ roles.153
Granting the President authority to refuse to enforce a law is
equivalent to granting him the authority to suspend laws; both
amount to a “constitutionally impermissible absolute veto power.”154
150. James A. Baker III & Warren Christopher, Put War Powers Back Where They Belong,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/opinion/
08baker.html?pagewanted=all.
151. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
152. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983); see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t was also necessary to provide him with the
means to resist legislative encroachment upon that power. The means selected were vari-
ous, including . . . the power to veto encroaching laws, or even to disregard them when
they are unconstitutional.” (citation omitted)).
153. H.R. REP. NO. 99-138, at 11 (1985).
154. Id. at 13.
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Only the legislature has the authority to suspend laws.155 Textually,
there is no discretion in the “take care” clause.156
The Court has occasionally taken a similar view. In the 1830s,
Congress passed an act directing the President to pay a postal em-
ployee a certain amount of money to settle a wage dispute. The Presi-
dent, through the Postmaster General, refused to do so. When the
employee sued, the President argued that Congress could not direct
the Postmaster General’s actions and he therefore retained discretion
not to make the payment. The Supreme Court disagreed: “To con-
tend, that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws
faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a
novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”157
More recently, the Supreme Court has found that the President is re-
quired to spend the amount Congress appropriated for a particular
action.158 The President “appears to have lost the argument” regard-
ing his authority to “impound” funds which Congress has already ap-
propriated.159 If the President can’t limit a congressional directive, it
follows a fortiori that the President can’t ignore one.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Executive retains some discre-
tion in analyzing a law’s constitutionality in order to protect its posi-
tion before the courts can intervene, such discretion would need to be
sharply limited. While drawing such a line is inescapably controversial,
importing a “clearly established” principle provides the most defensi-
ble framework. As even the Executive Branch’s own lawyers have rec-
155. Memorandum to from Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist in American Public
Law, Congressional Research Service, to the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Re: The Executive’s Duty to Enforce the Laws (Feb. 6, 1985) [hereinafter CRS EN-
FORCEMENT], reprinted in Constitutionality of GAO’s Bid Protest Function: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong. 544 (1985) (“The refusal
of the President to execute the law is indistinguishable from the power to suspend the laws.
That power, as is true of the power to amend or to revive an expired law, is a legislative
power.”); accord 2 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 767, at 1307 (1st ed. 1910) [hereinafter WILLOUGHBY, 1st ed.] (“Here the
President has to deal not with a measure in the process of enactment, as in the case when
the veto is exercised, but with a bill that has passed through all the constitutional forms of
enactment, and has become a law, and it would seem that he has no option but to enforce
the measure.”).
156. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 118 (arguing that the take care clause contains discre-
tion “goes against explicit, unambiguous constitutional text [and thus] is not persuasive”).
157. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).
158. See Train v. N.Y.C., 420 U.S. 35, 44–46 (1975).
159. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 117 (discussing presidential acceptance of the Budget
and Impounding Control Act, “which requires legislative approval of Executive decisions to
reduce or terminate programs for which Congress ha[s] authorized funds”); see Train v.
N.Y.C., 420 U.S. 35; Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136 (1975).
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ognized: “Unless the unconstitutionality of a statute is clear . . . [the
President] should not decline to enforce it unless he is compelled to
do so under the circumstances.”160 Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical
compelled murder statute fits these requirements. Relying on this
principle, the President would not be required to comply. However, in
the more common ambiguous case, “[t]he President should presume
that enactments are constitutional,” giving “great deference to the fact
that Congress passed the statute and that Congress believed it was up-
holding its obligation to enact constitutional legislation.”161 In the
context of treaty termination, this Article has demonstrated that Con-
gress has a strong claim to an independent power to terminate treaties
under certain circumstances. Such a power is not “clearly unconstitu-
tional,” and as a result even under this standard, the President would
be required to abide by the congressional mandate, before potentially
challenging the action in court.
3. The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: A Congressional Dictate
Prevailing over Presidential Opposition
In order to demonstrate how these arguments have played out in
reality, this section uses Congress’ most recent attempt to terminate a
treaty in the face of presidential opposition as a case study. In 1986, in
opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa, Congress enacted
sanctions legislation over presidential veto. As a component of that
legislation, Congress directed the President to terminate a tax
treaty162 and an air services treaty163 with South Africa.164 As the fol-
lowing discussion will show, not only was the constitutionality of that
directive never challenged by either branch, but the President
promptly complied with the enacted legislation despite his original
veto.
160. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 199, 204 (1994) (quoting Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Hon. Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President (Sept.
27, 1977)).
161. Id. at 200.
162. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for Establishing Rules of
Reciprocal Administrative Assistance with Respect to Taxes of Income, U.S.-S. Afr., Dec. 13,
1946, 3 U.S.T. 3821 (entered into force July 15, 1952) [hereinafter Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation].
163. Agreement Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories, U.S.-S.
Afr., May 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 3057.
164. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 306(b)(1),
313, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100, 1104.
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The draft of the Anti-Apartheid Act that was passed in the House
did not contain a provision for the termination of either treaty.165 The
provision terminating the Air Services Agreement was added by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,166 and the provision relating to
the Tax Treaty was added as a floor amendment.167 In both cases,
while subsequent discussion reiterated that the provisions would man-
date the termination of their respective treaties,168 there was no dis-
cussion regarding their constitutionality, or any concern about the
included directive to the President.169
President Reagan opposed the bill throughout its drafting be-
cause he believed that sanctions represented too drastic a measure,170
ultimately vetoing the bill when it reached his desk.171 His veto mes-
sage never directly discussed the sections requiring him to deliver no-
tification of the two treaties’ terminations to South Africa, but he did
state cryptically, “I am also vetoing the bill because it contains provi-
165. See 132 CONG. REC. H3861 (daily ed. June 18, 1986).
166. 132 CONG. REC. S11,548 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1986) (“Sec. 306 (a)(1) The Secretary
of State shall terminate the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of South Africa Relating to Air Services Be-
tween Their Respective Territories, signed May 23, 1947, in accordance with the provisions
of that agreement.”).
167. 132 CONG. REC. S11,629 (Aug 14, 1986) (“Sec. 314. The Secretary of State shall
terminate immediately the following convention and protocol, in accordance with its
terms, the Convention Between the Government of the Union of South Africa for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and for Establishing Rules of Reciprocal Administrative As-
sistance With Respect to Taxes on Income, done at Pretoria on December 13, 1946, and
the protocol relating thereto.”).
168. See S. REP. NO. 99-370, at 13–14 (1986) (“The Secretary of State is to terminate the
bilateral air services agreement now in effect with South Africa.”); 132 CONG. REC. S11,631
(daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (“Because the committee language
terminates a treaty relating to air travel between the United States and South Africa, no
flights would be allowed between the two countries once this amendment is adopted.”); id.
(“This amendment would terminate the treaty entitled ‘convention between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of South Africa
for the avoidance of double taxation and for establishing rules of reciprocal administrative
assistance with respect to taxes of income.”).
169. The bill’s constitutionality was implicitly assumed by the chair of the National Bar
Association’s tax committee in a 2002 article discussing its impact on the apartheid regime.
Calvin J. Allen, The Effective Role of United States International Tax Law in Dismantling
‘Apartheid’ in the Union of South Africa and in Rebuilding the Union of South Africa after the
Demise of ‘Apartheid,’ 27 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 165, 171–73 (2002).
170. Ronald Reagan, Veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1278, 1279 (Sept. 26, 1986) (“This, then, is the first and foremost reason I cannot
support this legislation. Punitive economic sanctions would contribute directly and mea-
surably to the misery of people who already have suffered enough. Using Amercia’s power
to deepen the economic crisis in this tortured country is not the way to reconciliation and
peace.”).
171. Id.
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sions that infringe on the President’s constitutional prerogative to ar-
ticulate the foreign policy of the United States.”172 However, this is
most likely a reference to President Reagan’s belief that by sanction-
ing South Africa, “the legislation discards our economic leverage, con-
stricts our diplomatic freedom, and ties the hands of the President of
the United States in dealing with a gathering crisis in a critical subcon-
tinent where the Soviet Bloc . . . clearly sees historic opportunity.”173
Thus, there is no indication President Reagan objected to the consti-
tutionality of the two congressional directives.
Soon thereafter, Congress reconvened and with little debate, and
no mention of the treaty terminations, overrode the President’s
veto.174 Despite his previous objections, President Reagan indicated
that “our administration will, nevertheless, implement the law.”175
Without objecting to the constitutionality of the direction, President
Reagan’s Secretary of State George Schultz duly notified South Africa
of the United States’ intention to terminate the tax treaty176 and the
air services treaty.177 The notification language is neutral, giving no
indication as to whether President Reagan believed he was acting to
terminate the treaties based on a congressional dictate or inherent
Executive authority.178
When the dust settled, Congress had prevailed. It had successfully
directed the President to terminate two treaties over his initial opposi-
172. Id. at 1279.
173. Id.
174. H.R. 4868, 99th Cong. (1986).
175. President’s Statement on the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1321 (Oct. 2, 1986).
176. See Treaties: Current Actions, DEP’T ST. BULL., Dec. 1986, at 87 (“Convention for the
avoidance of double taxation and for establishing rules of reciprocal administrative assis-
tance with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Pretoria Dec. 13, 1946. Entered into force
July 15, 1952. T.I.A.S. 2510. Notification of termination given by U.S.: Oct. 15, 1986; effec-
tive July 1, 1987.”).
177. See id. (“Agreement relating to air services, with annex and exchange of notes, as
amended. Signed at Cape Town May 23, 1947. Entered into force May 23, 1947. T.I.A.S.
1639, 2870, 6512. Notice of termination given by U.S.: Oct. 8, 1986; effective Oct. 10,
1987.”).
178. 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1981–88, at 2185 (Marian Nash ed., 1994) (quoting Note from Jeffrey N. Shane, Deputy
Assistant Sec’y of State for Transp. Affairs, to Johannes Hermanus Albertus Beukes, South
African Ambassador (Oct. 8, 1986)) (“On behalf of the Government of the United States
of America, I hereby request consultation pursuant to paragraph (B) of Article XI of the
[Air Services] Agreement and hereby give notice pursuant to paragraph (D) of Article XI
to terminate the Agreement. The Agreement shall terminate one year after the date of
receipt of this notice, which is being simultaneously communicated to the International
Civil Aviation Organization.”).
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tion. There is no indication in the record that any member of either
branch questioned the constitutionality of Congress’ action. Further-
more, despite the initial policy disagreement, once Congress overrode
his veto President Reagan duly complied with the congressional direc-
tives in less than a week.
As this section has shown, it appears that while Congress cannot
independently terminate a treaty, it has a well-established—though
not perfect—claim to the right to enact legislation directing the Presi-
dent to deliver notice of the United States’ termination of a treaty.179
While Presidents may claim the discretion to not enforce unconstitu-
tional statutes, such a right is by no means established, nor is it clear
that it would apply to treaty terminations if it did exist. Nevertheless,
as the next section will show, if a President does not comply with a
termination notification directive contained in a duly-enacted statute,
Congress has very few tools to compel his compliance.
IV. The Empty Toolkit: Ex Post Means by Which Congress
Can Compel Presidential Compliance with a
Termination Requirement
As the previous sections have demonstrated, while Congress can-
not itself deliver the notification necessary for termination of a treaty,
it has a strong constitutional claim that it has the power to direct the
President to deliver such notice. This then begs the question: if the
President refuses to abide by the directive, what tools does Congress
have to compel his compliance? Unfortunately for Congress, the an-
swer is very few.
A. Express Constitutional Powers: Appropriation and
Impeachment
Congress could try and use its spending power to cut off funding
for the implementation of the treaty. However, there are two
problems with this solution. First, a number of treaties require no ex-
press appropriation for their implementation. For example, the Tax
Treaty, referenced in the Anti-Apartheid Act discussed above, merely
called for reciprocal standards to prevent double taxation and there-
fore required little to no appropriated money.180 Second, for those
179. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 15, at 166 (“[Congress appears to] have a solid claim,
while no means a settled one, for the right to pass legislation that calls for the termination
of a treaty and the concomitant delivery of termination notice by the President.”).
180. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 162.
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treaties that do require funding, cutting off those funds can be politi-
cally infeasible. For example, cutting off funding for any treaty that
required U.S. personnel would render Congress liable for charges of
not supporting U.S. citizens, soldiers, or employees. When taken to-
gether, these two problems present large enough political obstacles
that Congress has never cut off appropriations for a treaty’s imple-
mentation, no matter how seriously they opposed its provisions.181
The only other explicit constitutional power Congress might use
to enforce compliance is impeachment.182 Congress could argue that
the President, by failing to deliver the treaty termination notification,
had violated his constitutional duty under the take care clause, and
had thereby committed an impeachable “high crime[ ] and misde-
meanor[ ].”183 President Andrew Johnson was impeached for failing
to implement duly-enacted legislation in 1867, “which it was con-
tended constituted a violation of the constitutional duty to ‘take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.’”184 More recently, Senator Gold-
water wrote a op-ed in which he threatened President Carter with im-
peachment proceedings over the treaty termination.185 Nevertheless,
it is unlikely that Congress would resort to such an extreme option
over a single treaty termination dispute.186 Given that only two Presi-
dents have ever been impeached—only one on constitutional
grounds—initiating an impeachment proceeding is likely to prove too
extreme a step to serve as a credible threat to deter presidential
noncompliance.
B. Challenging the Executive in Court
Congress might try and use the legal system to enjoin the Presi-
dent to comply with the terms of the legislation. However, while it is
181. Nelson, supra note 1, at 891–92; see also HENKIN, supra note 10, at 118 n.* (“Con-
gressional ‘weapons’ to see to it that the President does his duty to execute the laws are not
always effective, and sometimes Congress is reluctant to use them.”).
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; see also Nelson, supra note 1, at 893 (“[T]here is no
constitutional or other governmental machinery short of impeachment whereby the Presi-
dent could be forced to obey the statute.”).
183. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
184. CRS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 155, at 551.
185. Barry M. Goldwater, Abrogating Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1977, at 35 (“Any
President who would violate the Constitution on such a major matter as breaking faith with
the nation’s treaty obligations would run the risk of impeachment.”); see also Scheffer, supra
note 53, at 987 (“This presumably might make [the President] liable to impeachment as
Senator Goldwater has threatened.”).
186. See 2 WILLOUGHBY, 1st ed. , supra note 155, § 767, at 1306, 1309 (“As an instrument
of checking unconstitutional action on the part of the President, impeachment has been
found too cumbersome.”).
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true that the Supreme Court has never “invalidated an act of Congress
because it impinged upon the President’s sole power under the Con-
stitution,”187 courts have traditionally been unwilling to mediate for-
eign affairs disputes between the political branches. When the
Goldwater Court was confronted with the opposite side of this same
issue—whether a President could unilaterally terminate a treaty— the
Court relied upon a variety of prudential doctrines to dismiss the case,
leaving the issue to the political branches.188
Nevertheless, if Congress were to challenge the President in court
to compel compliance with its legislation, several of the objections
raised by the Goldwater Court could be overcome. First, the legislators
here would have standing, because “courts have upheld the standing
of legislators when the effectiveness of their votes is at stake.”189 When
the President’s action rises to the “nullification” of a Congressman’s
vote, the Congressman has standing to challenge the action.190 In this
case, the presidential noncompliance would serve to nullify votes cast
by Congress in favor of the statute.191 Second, the controversy would
be ripe for judicial review. By taking formal action, Congress will have
“assert[ed] its constitutional authority.”192 While the courts have been
hesitant to involve themselves when the political branches remain un-
committed, both Congress, through the statute, and the President,
through his noncompliance, would have formalized their positions
creating a quintessential “constitutional impasse,”193 necessitating ju-
dicial review.
187. GLENNON, supra note 24, at 13.
188. Goldwater III, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). Justice Powell held the complaint was
not ripe for review. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Stevens
and Chief Justice Burger held the case to be non-justiciable. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Stewart, Stevens, & Burger, JJ., concurring). Justice Brennan would have affirmed
the Court of Appeals and upheld the President’s discretion. Id. at 1006 (Brennan, dissent-
ing). Only Justices Blackmun and White would have set the case for oral argument. Id.
(Blackmun, J., joined by White, J., dissenting in part).
189. Scheffer, supra note 53, at 969; see also JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 30280, CONGRESSIONAL STANDING TO SUE: AN OVERVIEW (2011) (providing a back-
ground of the various situations in which Congressmen have been found to have standing).
190. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997).
191. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 146 (arguing that if Congress enacted a statute, it
would meet the standing requirements). By enacting the statute, this case could be distin-
guished from Goldwater where Congress never established a formal position. Goldwater III,
444 U.S. at 997 (a memorandum opinion in which five statements were issued); see also
Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing a challenge to President
Bush’s termination of the ABM treaty on both standing and political question grounds).
192. Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
193. Id.
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Despite these differences, this case would still face a substantial
challenge in convincing the Court not to dismiss the dispute on politi-
cal question grounds. Especially in foreign affairs, courts have tradi-
tionally been willing to leave decisions to the coequal political
branches, “each of which has resources available to protect and assert
its interests.”194 In the treaty termination context, Justice Rehnquist
has argued that “[i]n light of the absence of any constitutional provi-
sion governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact that different
termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties, the
instant case in my view also ‘must surely be controlled by political
standards.’”195
There are several factors that might work in the legislators’ favor
in avoiding such a dismissal however. Doctrinally, the legislators might
argue, as Justice Brennan did in Goldwater, that the political question
doctrine is aimed at keeping the Court from resolving foreign policy
disputes: “the doctrine does not pertain when a court is faced with the
antecedent question whether a particular branch has been constitution-
ally designated as the repository of political decision[-]making
power.”196 While that argument is doctrinally strong, it failed to per-
suade any of the other eight Justices in 1979. It might, however, fare
better today. The Court has been somewhat less willing to exclude
cases on political question grounds, potentially opening the door for a
future challenge in which the Court might adjudicate the separation
of powers question.197 Finally, even in Goldwater, a majority of the
Court decided the case on non-political question grounds, opening
up the possibility that a modern Court might be convinced to hear the
case on its merits.
Ultimately, there is no ex ante way to predict whether the judicial
system would involve itself in this dispute between the political
branches. However, given that a failure to intervene to compel com-
pliance would effectively uphold the status quo, granting the Presi-
dent the de facto authority to ignore a congressional directive,
194. Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (finding that the validity of Congress’ purported termination of
the treaty with France in 1798 was a political question); Made in the USA Found. v. United
States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the determination of what con-
stitutes a treaty is a political question).
195. Goldwater III, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
197. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); see also GLENNON, supra
note 24, at 315–25.
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Congress should seek additional tools to protect its constitutional
standing.
C. Ex Ante Control: What Congress Can Do Ahead of Time to
Expand its Influence
Realizing that it may be difficult to compel a President to comply
with the terms of its directives after the fact, Congress should take
several steps during the treaty ratification process in order to insure
itself a role in a possible termination. First, any executive agreement
which is concluded by the President under an authorizing statute can
be controlled by the terms of that statute: “To the extent that the
agreement in question is authorized by statute or treaty, its mode of
termination likely could be regulated by appropriate language in the
authorizing statute.”198 While Congress, after Chadha, is no longer
constitutionally capable of reserving the right to revoke that authori-
zation by concurrent resolution,199 a provision retaining the right to
terminate the agreement by duly-enacted legislation would presuma-
bly be constitutional.
Second, many of the “executive agreements to which the United
States is a party” already contain provisions providing “for termination
in the event Congress should fail to make the necessary appropria-
tions or should pass contrary legislation.”200 For example, the 1951
Agreement for a Cooperative Program of Agriculture with Honduras
provided that the agreement shall only become effective “subject to
the availability of appropriations of both parties for the purposes of
the program.”201 Such a provision is typically included at the request
of foreign states that do not want to be bound by an agreement that
the U.S. Congress has no intention of implementing through appro-
priations. As such, Congress might be able to combine these practices,
and insert a provision in every authorizing statute indicating that if
appropriations for an agreement concluded under its provisions are
not made in a designated period of time, the agreement is
terminated.
These procedures do not, however, help Congress retain control
over most treaties, which are concluded without the aid of an author-
198. CRS TREATY TERMINATION, supra note 60, at 208.
199. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 1, at 893 n.63 (listing several authorizations in which
Congress retained control to terminate/revoke by concurrent resolution).
200. Id. at 894.
201. Agreement for a Cooperative Program of Agriculture, U.S.-Hond., Jan. 30, 1951, 2
U.S.T. 577, 591.
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izing statute. The only means by which Congress, acting through the
Senate, can increase its control over the termination of these treaties
is through the advice and consent process. According to the Restate-
ment, if the Senate conditions its consent to the treaty to require “that
the President shall not terminate the treaty without the consent of
Congress or of the Senate, or that he shall do so only in accordance
with some other procedure, that condition presumably would be bind-
ing on the President if he proceeded to make the treaty.”202 Condi-
tions attached by the Senate in the ratification process are seen as
valid if they have a “plausible relation to the treaty, or to its adoption
or implementation” and if the President then “proceeds to make the
treaty he is bound by the condition.”203 In the debate over the Ver-
sailles Treaty, the Senate followed this practice and attached a condi-
tion that would have authorized the Treaty’s denunciation by
concurrent resolution.204
The power of the Senate to attach a termination condition is lim-
ited in several ways. First, the Supreme Court has struck down several
attempts by Congress to prescribe constitutionally novel procedures
for the enactment of law.205 Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled
that congressional vetoes that did not abide by the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment were unconstitutional.206 Therefore, a
condition reserving the termination right to the Senate, or to both
houses by concurrent resolution, “would presumably be unconstitu-
tional under Chadha.”207 However, a condition that required that the
President abide by legislation enacted over his veto would be in “con-
formity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription
202. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 339 cmt. a.
203. Id. § 303 cmt. d; see also HENKIN, supra note 10, at 184 n.** (“But if, as a condition
of its consent to a treaty, the Senate should serve special powers to interpret or terminate
the treaty, a President might have to accord it that role or refuse to ratify the treaty because
he cannot meet its conditions.”); Henkin, supra note 34, at 654 (“[A] condition applicable
to the treaty before it and having a plausible relation to it might pass.”); Sabis, supra note 3,
at 263 (“[I]t is of vital importance that when the Senate ratifies future treaties it requires
congressional consent of some form in their termination.”).
204. 59 CONG. REC. 5423 (1919) (“Notice of withdrawal by the United States [from the
League of Nations] may be given by concurrent resolution of Congress of the United
States.”); see also Quincy Wright, Validity of the Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 127–34 (1920) (finding the proposed condition invalid because trea-
ties cannot be denounced by concurrent resolution, not because the Senate can’t condi-
tion termination on a prescribed procedure).
205. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that Congress
cannot legislate that the Senate should be involved in the removal of appointments when
such a provision is not included in the Constitution).
206. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983).
207. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 140.
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for legislative action: passage by both Houses and presentment to the
President.”208 Attaching such a condition would reinforce Congress’
claim to an independent role in treaty termination and potentially
provide an extra incentive for judicial involvement.
D. The Most Reliable Means: Relying upon Political Pressure
Nevertheless, even if the Senate has attached a condition requir-
ing congressional participation in treaty termination, as the previous
section has illustrated, Congress has few tools it can use to reliably
compel compliance from a recalcitrant President; Congress is politi-
cally constrained from over-reliance on its appropriations authority,
an impeachment proceeding is typically too extreme, and the judici-
ary is unlikely to get involved. However, Congress can still resort to
what has traditionally been its most potent tool—political pressure.
“As a matter of political reality, the President still is often obligated to
respect the wishes of Congress, even if Congress is unable politically
or legally to force the President to obey the law and deliver notice.”209
In the rare instance in which two-thirds of both houses of Congress
agree on foreign policy, Congress would be able to bring enormous
political pressure to bear on the President.210 Presumably, a congres-
sional override of a presidential veto would require widespread bipar-
tisan and public support, an influential combination as evidenced by
President Reagan’s ultimate decision to abide by the provisions of the
Anti-Apartheid Act.211
208. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958.
209. Moriarty, supra note 15, at 151; accord Nelson, supra note 1, at 891 (“Moreover, it
must always be remembered that the President’s constitutional power to act is curtailed by
political considerations. No President can long determine national policy without the sup-
port of Congress and party.”).
210. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 214 n.* (“Politically of course, the President could not
lightly disregard the sense of Congress, especially if both houses joined, asserted constitu-
tional power, and publicly proclaimed a call for radical action.”).
211. This pattern was also followed in 1951, when Congress passed the Universal Mili-
tary Service and Training Act, Pub. L. No. 82-51, 65 Stat. 75 (1951), whose provisions were
in conflict with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Ger., Art.
VI, Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, 2136. Over time, the political pressure to reconcile the
domestic statute with the U.S.’s international noncompliance grew, eventually resulting in
the delivery of a notice of termination on June 2, 1953. See also Goldwater II, 617 F.2d 697,
715 (Wright, J., concurring) (citing several statutes that had the practical effect of nullify-
ing a treaty and which ultimately resulted in presidential delivery of termination).
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Conclusion
The Constitution is famously vague in allocating foreign affairs
powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Yet, in to-
day’s era of divided government, where coordinated cooperative ac-
tion between the branches often appears impossible, it is more
important than ever to identify the proper constitutional allocation of
power.
The Constitution explicitly allocates the power to enter into trea-
ties, but is silent regarding their termination. Recent scholarship,
spurred by several real-world examples, has focused on evaluating the
President’s independent authority to terminate treaties. While this de-
bate is far from settled, most scholars appear to have accepted that as
a practical matter, the President may have a unilateral termination
power.
Yet, there is no reason to believe that this authority—if it exists—
is exclusive. Using a direct and indirect textual analysis of the Consti-
tution, a review of historical practice and an analysis of existing case
law, this Article has demonstrated how Congress can constitutionally
claim an independent termination power of its own. By enacting legis-
lation, presumably over a President’s veto, there is a strong constitu-
tional argument that Congress has the authority to direct the
President to deliver the requisite termination notification.
This analysis may seem highly academic; after all how often is a
President going to oppose the combined will of a veto-proof majority
of both houses of Congress? Nevertheless, in today’s polarized world,
these possibilities have become more plausible. It is not inconceivable
that a President, especially a second-term President unconstrained by
an impending election, would stand up to a united majority in Con-
gress and refuse to terminate a treaty. Without an independent termi-
nation authority for Congress, a recalcitrant President could
unilaterally continue U.S. obligations under international law, despite
opposition from a super-majority in Congress.
Even more troubling would be the President’s authority to unilat-
erally bind the United States to new international obligations without
the prospect of review. Under U.S. law, a President’s signature on a
treaty generates no domestic obligations. However, under interna-
tional law, the United States would be “obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty.212 For ex-
ample, the United States has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
212. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1, art. 18., at 336.
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Ban Treaty (“CTBT”), and while it is not bound by the procedural
provisions in the treaty, it is likely under an international law obliga-
tion not to conduct a nuclear test; it is hard to see how conducting a
nuclear test would not violate a comprehensive test ban.213 Can the
President bind the United States to an international obligation so crit-
ical to national security as a cessation of nuclear testing without re-
view? President Clinton asserted such a right in 1999, when he
indicated that the United States was still bound by the “object and
purpose” requirements, even after the Senate explicitly rejected ratifi-
cation of the CTBT.214
This seeming immunity from review could be overcome however
if Congress had the authority to direct the President to terminate U.S.
involvement in a treaty; if Congress has the authority to direct delivery
of U.S. withdrawal from a ratified treaty, it should logically have the
authority to direct the President to remove his signature from a treaty,
thereby unbinding the United States from the international
obligation.
The President is the United States’ representative overseas and
has been constitutionally entrusted with a number of enumerated for-
eign affairs powers. These powers have only grown in recent decades,
through congressional acquiescence or support, most notably through
the centralization of power in the war on terror. Congress must there-
fore act to reassert its constitutional role in the treaty termination de-
bate. By protecting at least this minimal authority it can ensure that it
retains at least some role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, as
the Framers originally intended.
213. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 312 cmt. i (“Testing a weapon in contravention
of a clause prohibiting such a test might violate the purpose of the agreement, since the
consequences of the test might be irreversible.”).
214. Bill Gertz, Albright Says U.S. Bound by Nuke Pact; Sends Letters to Nations Despite Senate
Vote, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at A1 (“The administration believes it is still bound to
legally abide by the test-ban treaty because it has not given up on ratification in the future
. . . .”).
